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OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications

The OWASP GenAI Security Project published the Top 10 for Agentic Applications (ASI01–ASI10) on December 9, 2025 — the emerging reference taxonomy for threats specific to autonomous, tool-using AI agents: goal hijacking, tool misuse, memory poisoning, and more. Below is a straight account of where AgentGuards stands against each category today.

Coverage by category

ASI01Agent Goal HijackStrong

Prompt injection, jailbreak, LLM-as-judge semantic pass, PromptGuard ML classifier, and web-content injection checks screen every prompt and every fetched page before it reaches the model.

ASI02Tool Misuse & ExploitationPartial

Action governance validates every tool call against an allowlist, checks parameters, and risk-scores the action before it runs. Detecting poisoned or shadowed tool descriptors themselves is not yet covered.

ASI03Identity & Privilege AbusePartial

Per-tenant API key isolation, tool allowlisting, risk-based approval, and quota enforcement limit blast radius. A full agent-identity and permission graph is not yet built.

ASI04Agentic Supply Chain VulnerabilitiesPartial

Code Scan (SAST via semgrep, secrets via gitleaks) catches malicious code and leaked credentials before they're written. Scanning MCP server or tool manifests directly is not yet covered.

ASI05Unexpected Code ExecutionStrong

Shell-command risk scoring against a safe-binary allowlist and deny patterns, with critical-risk commands denied outright and Code Scan reviewing written code before it runs.

ASI06Memory & Context PoisoningPartial

Web-content injection checks screen fetched and retrieved content before it enters the model's context, and every decision is recorded to an audit trail. AgentGuards does not manage a persistent agent memory store itself.

ASI07Insecure Inter-Agent CommunicationGap

Not yet covered — AgentGuards screens a single agent's request/response path today, not agent-to-agent (A2A) protocol traffic.

ASI08Cascading FailuresStrong

Output validation — hallucination detection, schema validity, confidence thresholds, and policy compliance — rejects or repairs bad output before it propagates downstream.

ASI09Human-Agent Trust ExploitationStrong

Confidence and hallucination checks flag overconfident, ungrounded output, and action governance forces a human approval step on risky actions instead of silent execution.

ASI10Rogue AgentsPartial

Risk scoring, critical-risk auto-deny, and a full audit trail let you detect and block anomalous action patterns after the fact. A dedicated behavioral-drift or alignment monitor is not yet built.

How to read this

This is a self-assessment against a taxonomy we don't control, not a certification — nobody audits vendors against the OWASP Agentic AI Top 10 today. Strong means a real, shipped check directly addresses the threat. Partialmeans existing checks reduce but don't fully close the gap. Gapmeans it isn't covered yet. We'd rather under-claim than round up.

See the full list of checks AgentGuards runs on every request in the docs, including per-check OWASP LLM Top 10 and MITRE ATLAS tagging.

Need this for a security review?

Happy to walk through this mapping in more depth or fill out a vendor security questionnaire — just get in touch.